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Abstract
A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal
bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success
of this strategy depends on receivers’ beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable
news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either
by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing
some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical
of past or future non-disclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as
Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair’s reticence
over his son’s vaccine record during the MMR scare in the UK.
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1 Introduction
When does it make sense to tell the truth, but not the whole truth? Managers must avoid making
objectively false statements to investors, as these could later lead to large lawsuits or prison time.
However, telling the truth does not necessarily require telling the whole truth. Managers may be
able to withhold information or delay its release in order to ”manage” earnings and manipulate their
firm’s share price. Similar features are present in communication between voters and a politician
who must decide how much to reveal about past indiscretions, as well as in communication between
buyers and a seller who must decide how much to reveal about product quality.
The seminal ”unraveling” result is that when announcements are verifiable, communication is
fully revealing (Grossman and Hart 1980, Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981, Okuno-Fujiwara, Postle-
waite and Suzumura 1990). This is because, in equilibrium, receivers infer the worst whenever a
sender withholds information, leading senders to reveal everything but the very worst. This result
seems to fit some communication very well. For instance, during his first presidential campaign,
President George W. Bush said that he had not used illegal drugs at any time since 1974, when he
was 28 years old (CNN 1999). A reasonable person would infer that President Bush used illegal
drugs in 1973 and earlier.
In other cases, however, it seems unlikely that unraveling is occurring. For instance, when
Google announced in its IPO prospectus that it would not provide earnings guidance (Brin and
Page 2004), investors did not appear to infer the worst. On the contrary, Google’s share offering
was widely considered a success. Researchers have found voluntary disclosure to be incomplete for
food nutrition labeling (Mathios 2000), restaurant hygiene scores (Jin and Leslie 2003), and HMO
quality (Jin 2005). For an example from the domain of politics, consider the fact that, during
a United Kingdom (UK) health scare about an alleged link between the MMR (measles-mumps-
rubella) vaccine and autism, former UK Prime Minister Blair refused to say whether or not his son
Leo had received the MMR vaccine (Westscott 2001, BBC 2001b). Naively applying the unraveling
result leads to the inference that Leo did not have the vaccine, perhaps because there is a UK
government cover-up of a causal link to autism. However, Blair gave the public a reason not to
make this inference, and instead to trust the epidemiological evidence for vaccine safety: Blair
claimed his refusal to divulge Leo’s medical history stemmed from a desire to protect his family’s
privacy (Westscott 2001, NHS 2006). Since the public does not know whether or not Blair faces
high personal costs for revealing Leo’s medical history, they cannot infer the worst about the MMR
vaccine from Blair’s nondisclosure.
Indeed, subsequent research enriches the seminal theory by including features of exactly this
kind. Dye (1985), Jung and Kwon (1988), and Shin (1994, 2003) point out that if there is some
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positive probability that a sender is unable to make a disclosure, either from prohibitively high
disclosure costs or simple lack of information, then the unraveling result partially unravels. Senders
can partially conceal bad news by pooling with those who are unable to disclose. The authors argue
that senders will follow a sanitization strategy, revealing good news when possible but concealing
all bad news.
Unfortunately, this static sanitization result does not fully explain the behavior of Google,
Blair, or other senders who face repeated disclosure choices. For instance, while the sanitization
strategy describes selective disclosure of good news, Google announced that it would not provide
any earnings guidance. Moreover, senders’ self-described reasons for concealing information are
often inherently dynamic, based on the idea that concealing one piece of information today can
make it easier to conceal another tomorrow.
This paper therefore seeks to address two primary questions: First, in a dynamic setting, are
senders motivated to establish a precedent for nondisclosure, or a reputation for reticence? Second,
how do such reputational incentives affect equilibrium information disclosure? I show that the
desire to create a credible excuse for future nondisclosure, such as a believable claim about privacy
concerns, makes a reputation for reticence valuable. This value motivates withholding even good
news, and unravels the unraveling result still further.
For example, Blair’s nondisclosure may not only tell us something about Leo’s vaccination
history, but may also tell us something about Blair’s value of privacy. The fact that he withheld
private family information when it could have been politically expedient may send a strong signal
that Blair highly values his children’s privacy. Thus, it may be that Blair declined to disclose Leo’s
vaccination history simply because he wanted to develop a precedent for keeping family information
private. Such a precedent helps protect his ability to decline to answer future questions about his
family. This, in fact, was part of Blair’s motivation according to his own statement released on
December 22, 2001 (BBC 2001a):
The reason we have refused to say whether Leo has had the MMR vaccine is because
we never have commented on the medical health or treatment of our children. The advice
to parents to have the MMR jab is one of scores of pieces of advice or campaigns the
government supports in matters ranging from underage sex to teenage alcohol abuse...
Once we comment on one, it is hard to see how we can justify not commenting on them
all.
Similarly, firm management might prefer suppressing current good news, so as to help prevent
future nondisclosures from standing out. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that managers
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conceal good news for this reason; take for instance firms such as Google that have chosen not to
issue any earnings guidance. Moreover, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) find in a survey of
401 financial executives that:
The most common reason that executives limit voluntary disclosure is related to
setting a precedent. More than two-thirds of the survey participants... agree or strongly
agree that a constraint on current disclosure is the desire to avoid setting a disclosure
precedent that is difficult to maintain in the future.
Furthermore, several of the 20 CFOs the authors interviewed
state that they would not make an earnings forecast or start making voluntary
disclosures of non-financial leading indicators for fear of starting a practice that they
might later want to abandon. One CFO likened this process to ’getting on a treadmill’
that you can not get off. The market then expects the company to maintain the newly
initiated disclosures every quarter, regardless of whether the news is good or bad.
Whether in politics or finance, these explanations for hiding information are inherently dynamic,
and hence motivate this paper’s analysis. I develop a model using Jung and Kwon’s (1988) one-shot
verifiable-disclosure game as a starting point. In the one-shot game, a manager learns disclosable
information about the value of her firm with probability θ and must choose whether to disclose this
to the market. My innovation incorporates two new elements: uncertainty by investors surrounding
the manager’s type θ, and repeated interaction between the investors and the firm.
I characterize equilibrium disclosure under two alternate assumptions about the level of discre-
tion in disclosure. Initially, I assume that senders may delay disclosure by at most one period (A1).
Later I allow senders to delay disclosure indefinitely (A2). Since public companies cannot suppress
results indefinitely, A1 may be most appropriate for understanding firm disclosures to investors.
On the other hand, A2 is relevant to senders like Blair who can conceal Leo’s medical records as
long as he wishes.
Given at most one-period delay (A1), I show that reputational concerns cause all senders to
conceal some good news in all equilibria, and in some cases senders may initially hide all infor-
mation. Hiding information initially softens the market’s reaction towards future nondisclosure.
This matches Graham et al.’s (2005) findings well. I also find equilibria in which senders actually
disclose bad news initially to signal their future reticence. This may explain the common advice
to get bad news out early and the frequency with which firms do so - such early revelations may
help persuade the market that future nondisclosures do not hide more bad news. (Skinner (1994)
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finds that firms preempt bad quarterly earnings reports about 25% of the time, but other earnings
reports less than 10% of the time.) These equilibria are supported by the intuitive criterion, yet
intuitively appealing equilibria in which all bad news is concealed always exist.
Allowing indefinite delay of disclosure (A2) introduces an important new element: reputational
concerns become backward-looking as well as forward-looking. A sender may conceal good news
today not only to protect the credibility of a future nondisclosure but also that of a past nondisclo-
sure.1 Moreover, if a sender discloses good news today, prior non-disclosures will be treated with
greater skepticism, and hence the sender may choose to simultaneously reveal previously hidden
information. Hence information is frequently bottled up and then comes out all at once or not at
all.
The following section describes related papers not discussed elsewhere in the text. Section 3
describes the model, Sections 4 and 5 characterize equilibrium disclosure under assumptions A1 and
A2 (with additional details in Appendix A), and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix
B.
2 Related Literature
There is a large body of related literature concerning discretionary verifiable disclosure, for which
Verrecchia (2001), Healy and Palepu (2001), and Dranove and Jin (2009) provide excellent surveys.
There are also several especially relevant papers that investigate situations in which a sender distorts
his or her communication choices to try to convey objectiveness and hence improve credibility of
future communication (Sobel 1985, Benabou and Laroque 1992, Morris 2001, Avery and Meyer
2003, Dziuda 2007). In these models, decision maker uncertainty about sender bias means that
credibility arises from developing a reputation for being unbiased. In contrast, in this paper all
senders are equally biased and sender reputation concerns the likelihood of receiving disclosable
news, which affects the credibility of nondisclosure.
In repeated cheap talk settings, Sobel (1985) and Benabou and Laroque (1992) assume that
unbiased senders have no incentive to be dishonest, and examine the trade-off biased senders face
between developing credibility through honesty, and lying to cash in on their reputations. Morris
(2001) endogenizes cheap talk of both biased and unbiased senders and finds that reputational
incentives to appear objective lead even unbiased senders to distort information. If advisors may
1It is intriguing to note that Blair specifically cites previous nondisclosure as a reason for not talking about Leo
(see previous quote), whereas Graham et al. (2005) attribute only forward looking incentives for nondisclosure to
CFOs. Although only anecdotal, this difference exactly matches the predicted effect of a change in the level of sender
discretion between A2 and A1.
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be either objective, or biased against a politically correct policy, an objective advisor may give
overly politically correct advice to maintain future credibility. In a similar vein, Avery and Meyer
(2003) show that a reference letter writer biased in favor of his or her own candidates may be overly
harsh early on and not recommend candidates who would be desirable hires from the employer’s
perspective. Dziuda (2007) analyzes a static verifiable-disclosure game in which a sender observes
multiple signals and has a bias (left, right, or honest) that is unknown to the receiver. Biased
senders reveal all good signals, but rather than sanitize their reports completely, they also reveal
some bad signals in order to pool with the honest sender.
Other sender-receiver games with reputational effects focus on accuracy rather than objectivity.
For instance, in a cheap-talk setting, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) demonstrate that otherwise
neutral media companies will bias news reports towards the prior beliefs of their customers to
develop a reputation for accuracy. Prendergast (1993) shows that optimal incentives for collecting
accurate information explain the presence of ”yes men” in organizations. In both papers, as well
as other related works (e.g. Ottaviani and Sørensen 2006a, 2006b), an expert’s incentive to make
reports conform to a receiver’s prior leads to the loss of valuable information. Prat (2005) shows
that such information loss can sometimes be mitigated by delegating a decision to the expert and
committing to observe only the consequences of the decision, not the choice itself. Reputational
concerns for accuracy can also lead experts to distort reports in the opposite direction: away from
a receiver’s prior (e.g. Prendergast and Stole (1996), Levy (2004), and Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2006b)).
Teoh and Hwang’s (1991) related paper takes a distinctly different approach. They show that
with the right signal structure2 in a two-period model, a firm may initially hide a good signal
and disclose a bad signal to credibly signal a favorable (but unverifiable) component of firm value.
Unlike this paper or those discussed immediately above, in Teoh and Hwang (1991) the distortion
of disclosure does not enhance credibility of communication. As a result, second-period disclosure
choices are independent of those in the first period. Thus hiding good news does not set a precedent
for nondisclosure. Instead, unraveling always applies in the second period.
The most relevant work outside the literatures on disclosure and sender-receiver games is the
segment of the repeated games literature that examines repeated interaction between a single
long-lived player with private information about his or her type and a series of short-lived players.
Chapters 15 and 17 of Mailath and Samuelson’s (2006) book provide an excellent reference. Assume
2The result requires that a future verifiable binary signal of firm value is more likely to be good for a high-type
firm than a low-type firm, that firm value is higher for a high-type firm than a low-type firm independent of the
verifiable signal, and that firm value has increasing differences in the unverifiable firm type and the verifiable signal.
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that a long-lived player in an infinitely repeated game may be strategic and arbitrarily patient, or
one of a variety of commitment types. A typical result is that, with a rich enough set of commitment
types, the strategic type will profit as much from short-run player uncertainty about her type as she
could from commitment power without that uncertainty. Such a result would have little relevance
in an infinitely repeated version of my model, however, because commitment power has no value
given common knowledge of a sender’s type. (A receiver who knows the sender’s strategy will
always correctly interpret the sender’s disclosures on average, regardless of the particular strategy
in use.) Moreover, I do not assume that uncertainty revolves around whether the sender is a
strategic type or a commitment type. In my model both sender types are strategic, but they differ
in their likelihood of receiving disclosable information. (The exception is in Section 5 where I focus
on a special case with only one strategic type.)
3 Model Description
I will first describe a reduced form sender-receiver game, and then outline specific examples captured
by the model. Afterwards, I adopt the terminology of the final example concerning communication
between a firm and investors.
Players: Game players are a sender (firm) and a receiver (investors).
Information Structure: In each of two periods t ∈ {1, 2}, nature chooses an outcome xt that
has mean µt and is independently distributed across the bounded support [At, Bt] with cumulative
distribution Ft. The distribution Ft is continuous, strictly increasing, and common knowledge. In
each period, with independent probability θ, the sender privately receives a disclosable, verifiable,
and fully informative signal st = xt. Alternatively, with probability (1− θ), the sender receives no
disclosable information (st = φ).
While the sender knows the probability θ with which signals are disclosable, the receiver is
uncertain. In particular, prior to period one, nature chooses θ to be H with probability q ∈ (0, 1),
or to be L with probability (1− q), where L is strictly less than H. The sender privately learns her
value of θ, which is constant across periods, but cannot directly and credibly disclose this value to
the receiver.
Communication: After receiving signal st in period t, the sender makes a report rt ∈ {st, φ} to
the receiver, and may update previous reports concerning earlier signals. Based upon these reports
and other publicly available information (It), the receiver updates his expectation of x1 and x2.
The sender must give a truthful report due to the threat of severe penalty, but may strategically
avoid telling the whole truth by not reporting any information. Thus, a sender with no disclosable
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information has no choice but to report nothing (rt = φ), while a sender with a disclosable signal
may either reveal the true outcome (rt = xt), or strategically conceal it (rt = φ).
Payoffs: In each period, the receiver plays a static best response which is a function of his
expectations of outcomes x1 and x2. The sender’s reduced form payoff is given by equation (1).
Π = E [x1|I1] + δE [x1 + x2|I2] (1)
Feasible Delay: Finally, I make two different assumptions about how long the sender can
conceal information.
Assumption A1 (Short Delay): The sender can delay disclosure of information by at most one
period. Regardless of the disclosures made in period one, the receiver learns the value of x1 in
period two. (Note, in this case payoffs reduce to Π = E [x1|I1] + δE [x2|I2].)
Assumption A2 (Indefinite Delay): The sender can delay disclosure of information indefinitely.
The receiver does not learn the value of x1 in period two unless it is disclosed by the sender.
I consider assumption A1 in Section 4, and the alternate assumption A2 for the special case
in which L = 0 in Section 5. The analysis is qualitatively different under A2 because the sender’s
period-two report may cause the receiver to revise his beliefs about x1. Assumption A2 corresponds
to the MMR example in which the public may never learn whether Leo Blair was vaccinated. In
contrast, assumption A1 corresponds to a firm’s choice of whether or not to issue earnings guidance,
since regardless of the guidance choice, earnings will be announced in the upcoming quarterly report.
Similarly, Google may choose whether or not to disclose the planned launch of a new service such
as Gmail, but cannot help making it public when actually launching the service.
A critical assumption of the model is that the sender receives verifiable and disclosable infor-
mation with probability θ, but with probability (1− θ) receives no disclosable information. The
literature offers two interpretations for this assumption. First, the sender could simply be unin-
formed some of the time. Second, the sender might always receive verifiable information, but in
some cases its disclosure could be prohibitively costly. The examples below illustrate both inter-
pretations.
3.1 Examples
3.1.1 Seller Communicating with Buyers
A natural example is that in which the sender is a seller who auctions an asset with common
value xt in each of two periods. With probability θ, the seller learns the value of the asset, but
with probability (1− θ) the seller is uninformed. The receiver represents a collection of competitive
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bidders who will bid in each auction until the asset sells for its expected value given publicly available
information. The value of the first asset becomes publicly known before the second auction. Thus
the seller earns revenues of E [x1|r1] + δE [x2|r1, r2, x1], which corresponds to equation (1) given
assumption A1. (Given A1, the sender cannot influence E [x1|I2] = x1, so it does not affect the
sender’s optimal strategy.)
3.1.2 Tony Blair Communicating with his Constituents
In the MMR example, x1 may be interpreted as a measure of vaccine safety, such as an indicator for
Leo having had the jab.3 This may not be disclosable because it concerns a particularly sensitive
subject (family medical records) for which Tony Blair’s direct value of privacy may override political
concerns. Equation (1) captures the idea that Blair’s payoff is increasing in public confidence about
vaccine safety in both periods, as well as in public confidence about some other issue x2 raised by the
press in a future period.4 Here A2 is the appropriate assumption, since the public will not find out
about Leo’s medical history unless Blair discloses the information. As a result, Blair must continue
to manage public expectations about vaccine safety when responding to future questions about
other issues. For instance, if Blair disclosed information about Leo’s Polio vaccination today, the
public would likely view Blair’s nondisclosure about Leo’s MMR vaccine with increased skepticism.
3.1.3 Firm Management Communicating with Investors
Let the underlying value of a firm be the sum of the two outcomes: V = x1 + x2. Assume that
firm management maximizes the value of the firm to existing shareholders, some small fraction
(1− δ) > 0 of whom must sell in each of periods 1 and 2 for liquidity reasons. These liquidity
sales will take place at the prevailing share price St, which will equal the market’s expectation of
firm value, given existing public information E [x1 + x2|It]. Then, in a third period, an outside
buyer acquires the firm and pays shareholders the true value of the firm, as discovered through due
diligence. The firm’s objective function is therefore given by equation (2).
Π = (1− δ)S1 + δ (1− δ)S2 + δ2V (2)
On the one hand, with probability (1− θ), information possessed by the firm about outcome xt
3Strictly speaking this doesn’t fit the model, since I assume xt are continuous random variables. However, the
basic features of the model are still present with binary random variables.
4In this example, the linearity of payoffs in equation (2) is somewhat restrictive, but as discussed in Section 4.3,
this assumption can be relaxed.
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will be proprietary in the sense that its disclosure would not only be informative about firm value
and influence share prices, but also adversely affect underlying firm value if disclosed. When the
number of liquidity trades (1− δ) is small, the firm’s primary objective is to maximize the firm’s
true value V . Hence, the firm will avoid disclosing such proprietary information.
On the other hand, with probability θ, information possessed by the firm about outcome xt
will be nonproprietary, in the sense that its disclosure would not affect underlying firm value, and
merely influence short run share prices.5 The firm will disclose or withhold such nonproprietary
information in order to maximize the discounted sum of share prices: Πˆ = (S1 + δS2), which
matches equation (1) for δ ∈ (0, 1) up to the constant E [x2|I1] = µ2.6 Either assumption A1 or A2
may be appropriate, depending on whether x1 becomes public knowledge in the interim between
periods 1 and 2.
I will use the language of this example (firm and market for players, and proprietary or non-
proprietary information for signal type) throughout the rest of the paper.
4 Equilibrium with short disclosure delay (A1)
4.1 Second-period disclosure
When information disclosure can be delayed by at most one period, the firm’s objective function
reduces to equation (3) since the firm cannot influence E [x1| I2].
Πˆ = E [x1| r1] + δE [x2| r1, r2, x1] (3)
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium can be characterized by starting with the second-period contin-
uation game. In this case, the second-period continuation game and its unique equilibrium coincide
with Jung and Kwon’s (1988) one-type static model. In Jung and Kwon’s (1988) model, there is
only one type of firm θ¯, one period, and one outcome x with distribution F and mean µ.
The unique equilibrium is for the firm to sanitize by disclosing the outcome x if it is nonpropri-
etary and exceeds a unique threshold x¯S equal to the market’s expectation following nondisclosure:
E [x| r = φ]. Outcomes below this point are ”bad news” and concealed, since they lower market
expectations relative to nondisclosure. Outcomes above this point are ”good news” and are dis-
5It is also possible for firms to possess some information that would directly increase firm value if disclosed. For
instance, a market leader like Microsoft might directly benefit from announcing its product-development plans in
advance, so that smaller competitors know to retreat. I do not consider this possibility in this paper.
6Empirical evidence shows that firm management does strategically time disclosures in order to influence short
run share prices, although not necessarily to maximize shareholder value (e.g. Aboody and Kasznik (2000)).
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closed, since they raise market expectations.7 The threshold x¯S
(
θ¯, F
)
is a function of the likelihood
of nonproprietary information θ¯, and the distribution of outcomes F , defined implicitly by equation
(4) (Jung and Kwon 1988, equation 7):
x¯S = E [x| r = φ] =
(
1− θ¯)µ+ θ¯F [x¯S]E[x|x ≤ x¯S ](
1− θ¯)+ θ¯F (x¯S) . (4)
In the second-period continuation game of my model, both types L and H also sanitize by
disclosing only nonproprietary good news. I incorporate uncertainty about the manager’s type
θ by working with the market’s second-period updated beliefs q′ = Pr (θ = H| r1, x1) and θ¯′ =
q′H + (1− q′)L given both the first-period disclosure r1, and the exogenous revelation of x1. The
threshold for disclosing x2 (the market’s expectation of x2 following its nondisclosure) is then given
by x¯2 = x¯
S(θ¯
′
, F2), and the firm’s expected second-period payoff Π2 is:
Π2 (θ, x¯2) = ((1− θ) + θF2 [x¯2]) x¯2 + θ (1− F2 [x¯2])E [x2|x2 > x¯2] . (5)
Proposition 1 The market’s expectation of x2 following its nondisclosure, and the firm’s expected
second-period payoff, are both decreasing in the market’s expectation θ¯
′
.8 The firm’s expected second-
period payoff has increasing differences in θ and θ¯
′
.
Proposition 1 shows that firms value a reputation for primarily receiving proprietary signals
(low θ¯
′
): investors will treat nondisclosure with less skepticism if they expect the firm’s signal to
be proprietary much of the time. Moreover, Proposition 1 shows that low-types have a greater
incentive to improve their reputation than do high-types. This endogenous single-crossing property
causes separating behavior in the first period, and leads standard refinements to select equilibria
in which bad news is disclosed in the first period9 (Proposition 4). It arises because the benefit
of improved reputation, improved credibility for the ”proprietary” excuse following nondisclosure,
is only realized ex-post if a firm actually reports nothing about x2. A given improvement in
7I define good and bad news relative to market expectations conditional on nondisclosure. An alternative con-
vention, often useful for interpreting empirical work, defines good and bad news relative to lagged expectations
(in this context the unconditional expectation µ). Under this interpretation, nondisclosure itself is bad news since
E [x|r = φ] < µ. Several studies confirm that nondisclosure is bad news relative to prior expectations. For instance,
Chen, Matsumoto and Rajgopal (2007) find that stock prices fall upon announcement of earnings guidance cessation.
8The firm’s second-period expected payoff is increasing in the firm’s true probability θ of receiving nonproprietary
news, since the firm is only able to report good news when its information is nonproprietary. If θ¯
′
= θ then second-
period expected payoff Π2 = µ2. Market uncertainty about firm type allows θ¯
′
to differ from θ, Π2 to differ from µ2,
and hence first period strategies to differ from the static case.
9This is related to counter signaling, which arises due to differences in the distribution of exogenous ”extra
information” across types (Feltovich, Harbaugh and To 2002).
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reputation will therefore benefit low-type firms more than high-type firms, since low-types have a
greater probability of receiving proprietary signals, and therefore of disclosing nothing.
4.2 First-period disclosure
First-period firm strategy is described by a pair of functions {σL (x1) , σH (x1)} that give the proba-
bility of first-period disclosure of outcome x1, conditional on the news being nonproprietary. When
concealing the first-period outcome until period two, the firm receives immediate payoff x¯1, which
is equal to the market’s expectation E [x1|r1 = φ]:
x¯1 =
µ1 − E [x1 (qHσH (x1) + (1− q)LσL (x1))]
1− E [qHσH (x1) + (1− q)LσL (x1)] . (6)
Note that the value x¯1 is the dividing threshold between good news (x > x¯) and bad news (x < x¯).
In the first period, the firm has to consider more than the impact of good or bad news on the current
share price; it must also take into account its reputation in the following period. Proposition
2 highlights differences from the static sanitization equilibrium which arise from this additional
consideration.
Proposition 2 In all equilibria: (1) both types of firms will always conceal at least some nonpro-
prietary good news, and (2) the market gives greater credibility to first-period nondisclosure than
in the static sanitization equilibrium: x¯1 > x¯
S
1 ≡ x¯S(θ¯, F1).
The original unraveling result is that firms follow a sanitization strategy and reveal only good
news. Moreover, the adverse inference following nondisclosure is so severe that in comparison all
news is good news, and hence all news is disclosed. Papers by Jung and Kwon (1988), Shin (1994,
2003) and others show that while firms will still sanitize and only disclose good news, a positive
probability of non-disclosable proprietary information tempers the market’s adverse inference fol-
lowing nondisclosure. Hence the unraveling result is partially unraveled – some news is now bad
news relative to nondisclosure, and is concealed.
Proposition 2 shows that in a dynamic context market uncertainty about the likelihood of
nonproprietary news further unravels the unraveling result in two ways. First, the market’s adverse
inference following nondisclosure is moderated further. Second, firms no longer sanitize, and instead
always conceal some good news. This is because pooling with firms who have non-disclosable
proprietary news reduces market skepticism about future nondisclosure. While both these effects
correspond to reduced disclosure, reputational incentives can also lead to disclosure of bad news,
which never occurs in the static model. As Propositions 3 and 4 will show, while there always exist
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equilibria with full concealment of bad news, standard refinements select equilibria in which bad
news is disclosed.
4.2.1 Monotonic Equilibria
In order to further characterize equilibrium disclosure, I examine two classes of equilibria separately.
First, I will focus on equilibria in which market beliefs about the firm’s type θ are monotonically
increasing in the level of first-period disclosure. While these equilibria are plausible, some standard
equilibrium refinements rule out monotonic equilibria. Hence, Section 4.2.2 analyzes non-monotonic
equilibria.
Monotonic Equilibria: Beliefs are monotonic if the market’s belief that the firm is the high-
type that frequently receives nonproprietary news is weakly higher given first-period disclosure than
first-period nondisclosure. An equilibrium is monotonic if beliefs are monotonic.
Given monotonic beliefs,10 there is always a weak reputational benefit of nondisclosure. Thus,
it is always optimal for both types to conceal bad news. For good outcomes, the reputational
benefit of concealment varies with the market’s beliefs about the firm’s disclosure policy. The
reputational benefit for concealing a good outcome x1 is higher when the market expects the low-
type to conceal x1 than when the market expects the low-type to reveal x1. As a result, for a range
of good outcomes, market beliefs about the low-type’s disclosure policy are self-fulfilling, and hence
there are multiple monotonic equilibria with varying amounts of disclosure of good news in the first
period.11
All monotonic equilibria lie somewhere between two extremes: the minimum and maximum
monotonic-disclosure equilibria. Figure 1 depicts the qualitative features of these equilibria. (See
Proposition 6 and Solutions 1-2 in Appendix A for a precise characterization.) In each, the low-type
discloses only above a threshold. When the low-type uses the highest possible threshold (minimum
disclosure), the high-type discloses strictly more news, gradually switching from full concealment to
full disclosure over a range of outcomes that the low-type conceals.12 When the low-type uses the
lowest possible threshold (maximum disclosure) the equilibrium market expectation x¯1 is smaller.
10Monotonic off-equilibrium beliefs are supported by small trembles as long as a low-type is not too much more
likely to make an accidental disclosure than a high-type.
11In contrast, the market’s beliefs about the high-type’s disclosure policy are not self-reinforcing. If the market
expects the high-type to conceal outcome x1, then the incentive to do so is lower than otherwise. As a result, while
multiplicity arises from variation in the low-type’s strategy, given a particular strategy for the low-type, that for the
high-type is pinned down.
12The high-type does not use a threshold strategy, because increased disclosure by the high type makes disclosure
less attractive.
12
In fact, x¯1 is at its minimum across all monotonic equilibria because the least amount of good news
is pooled with undisclosed news, and hence the market’s adverse inference following nondisclosure
is most severe. Moreover, for some parameters the high-type may jump to full disclosure at the
same threshold as the low-type as shown in Figure 1.
A1. Monotonic Strategy, No Labels
( )min
( )1min xLσ
Minimum-Disclosure Monotonic-Equilibrium
1
Bad News Good News
1xHσ
0
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Maximum-Disclosure Monotonic-Equilibrium
Sx1
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0
Sx1
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Figure 1: Hypothetical monotonic minimum and maximum disclosure equilibria. Due to the in-
creased disclosure of good news, market expectation x¯1 is lower in the maximum-disclosure equi-
librium.
The maximum-disclosure equilibrium involves the greatest disclosure of nonproprietary signals
about x1 in period one, among all monotonic equilibria. However, it may communicate less informa-
tion about firm type θ to the market so that second-period nondisclosures are less well understood.
Thus, it is ambiguous whether short run share prices track underlying firm value more closely in
the maximum or the minimum-disclosure equilibrium.
Proposition 3 summarizes general properties of all monotonic equilibria.
Proposition 3 A monotonic equilibrium always exists. In all monotonic equilibria: (1) In the first
period, firms not only conceal all bad news, but also conceal some nonproprietary good news that
13
would be tempting to disclose in the short run. (2) The low-type conceals more nonproprietary
news than the high-type (3) First period nondisclosure both reduces future disclosure, and makes
the market more forgiving of future nondisclosure. (In this sense a first period nondisclosure sets
a precedent for future nondisclosure.)
Although some good news is always concealed in equilibrium, the amount of good news concealed
depends on outcome distributions and other model parameters.13 Figure 1 depicts disclosure of
very good news by both types in both minimum and maximum monotonic-disclosure equilibria.
This is not a general feature, as reputational incentives may be strong enough to compel firms to
conceal all first period information. Moreover, this will always be the case if there is sufficient
uncertainty about the second period outcome x2.
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4.2.2 Non-Monotonic Equilibria
While monotonic equilibria are plausible, standard equilibrium refinements select non-monotonic
equilibria in which some bad news is disclosed. Upon receiving nonproprietary good news, the
only possible way for a firm to signal low-type is to conceal the news and pool with firms who have
proprietary information. Disclosing bad news can be a signal of low-type, however, if in equilibrium
low-types disclose nonproprietary bad news with sufficiently higher probability than do high-types.
In this case, such early revelations help persuade the market that future nondisclosures do not
hide more bad news. Disclosing bad news can be a credible signal of low-type because it incurs an
immediate cost, similar to earning an education in Spence (1973). Although this cost (x1 − x¯1) is
the same for both low and high type firms, a low-type gains more from improving its reputation
(Proposition 1), and hence strictly prefers to disclose bad news when a high-type is indifferent.
At the opposite extreme from monotonic equilibria are those in which the widest possible interval
of bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. In such equilibria, the low-type discloses all bad news above
a certain threshold, and the high-type uses a mixed disclosure strategy for all bad news above a
strictly higher threshold. (See Condition 1 in Appendix A for a precise characterization of maximal
bad-news disclosure strategies.)
Figure 2 illustrates two hypothetical equilibria with maximum bad news disclosure15 (Satisfy-
13First period disclosure decreases with δ and increases with L. The relationship between disclosure, and the out-
come distributions and parameters H and q is less clear cut. See Appendix A for additional discussion of comparative
statics.
14This is similar to Nanda and Zhang’s (2006) result in a static framework that a good signal may be concealed if
its value is sufficiently uninformative and its observation is strongly correlated with that of an informative signal.
15I mean maximum bad news disclosure in the weak sense that the widest possible interval of bad news is disclosed.
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ing Condition 1 for all bad news). The first plot in the figure assumes that for good news the
minimum-disclosure monotonic-equilibrium strategy is used (Appendix A, Solution 1). The second
plot assumes that for good news, the maximum-disclosure monotonic-equilibrium strategy is used
(Appendix A, Solution 2).
A1. Non-Monotonic Strategy, No Labels
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( )1xLσ
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Maximum Bad-News / Minimum Good-News Disclosure-Equilibrium
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Figure 2: Non Monotonic Equilibria that satisfy D1.
As shown in Figure 2, low-types are willing to reveal worse news than high-types. Moreover,
in equilibrium low-types either do not disclose a piece of bad news at all, or disclose it with higher
probability than high-types, unconditional on whether it is proprietary or not, so that the disclosure
is a signal of low-type. Figure 2 shows both types reveal bad news in a neighborhood below x¯1,
which is true of any equilibrium with maximum bad news disclosure.
The Figure 2 strategies for bad news are the same in both plots relative to x¯1. However x¯1 is
lower in the second plot, since firms conceal less good news. Further, relative to Figure 1, in both
plots x¯1 is higher in the non-monotonic case, since there is greater disclosure of bad news.
This corresponds to the largest probability of bad news disclosure when the outcome x1 is uniformly distributed.
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Proposition 4 All monotonic equilibria fail the D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987, Banks and
Sobel 1987, Cho and Sobel 1990), appropriately defined for this setting. For certain parameters,
monotonic equilibria also fail the weaker intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987). All non-
monotonic equilibria with maximal bad news disclosure (of which multiple exist) satisfy D1.
Proposition 4 states that the D1 criterion always rules out monotonic equilibria in favor of
non-monotonic equilibria, and that the weaker intuitive criterion may do so as well. Nevertheless,
monotonic equilibria are very plausible, and should not be ignored.
Neither Cho and Kreps (1987) nor Banks and Sobel (1987) provide a behavioral defense for the
strong D1 criterion. Cho and Kreps (1987) do provide a behavioral motivation for the intuitive
criterion. The intuition is that upon receiving moderately bad news, a low-type firm could deviate
from a monotonic equilibrium by disclosing the bad news and making the following speech: ”By
disclosing bad news I ought to convince you that I am the low-type who is infrequently able to make
disclosures. If I am able to convince you, it will have been in my interest to make the disclosure.
Were I the high-type who is frequently able to make disclosures, I would have no incentive to
disclose this bad news, regardless of whether or not you are persuaded.”
The speech that motivates the intuitive criterion certainly has an intuitive appeal, but it is a
sophisticated rather than a straightforward intuition. It is plausible that an audience would not find
such a speech compelling. For instance, imagine Tony Blair surprising the public by announcing
that Leo was not vaccinated and, at the same time, making a speech perversely asking the public
to interpret the violation of Leo’s privacy as evidence that he is normally very concerned about
his family’s privacy. It seems plausible that, contrary to the intuitive criterion, the public would
instead have reasoned that Tony Blair is more likely to be someone who normally does not value
his family’s privacy.
The straightforward belief that off-equilibrium revelations of bad news are mistakes equally
likely to be from either type supports concealment of all bad news in any equilibrium. Such an
off-equilibrium belief seems just as intuitive, if not more so, than a non-monotonic equilibrium.
Moreover, while Skinner (1994) finds evidence that firms selectively disclose bad news, several
other studies find evidence that firms delay bad news disclosure (e.g. Chambers and Penman
(1984), Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009), and Sletten (2009)). As a result, attention should be
given to both non-monotonic and monotonic equilibria.
4.3 Strength of Reputational Incentives
Propositions 2-3 show that reputational incentives cause all firms to hide some initial good news,
and Proposition 4 points out that reputational concerns can actually lead firms to announce bad
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news. What affects the strength of reputational incentives, and the corresponding size of these
distortions away from static sanitization? Within the existing model, reputational incentives will
be strongest when the market is very uncertain about the firm’s type ex ante, and when future
disclosures are important (see Appendix A).
The importance of future disclosures depends not only on the firm’s discount factor δ, but
upon the amount of information which arrives in the future. A reputation for reticence is most
valuable when there is large uncertainty about the future realization of x2. Thus, while shifting
the distribution of x2 upwards by a constant has no effect on disclosure, increasing the spread of x2
can reduce first period disclosure of good news. In fact, holding all else fixed, there always exists a
mean preserving spread of the second-period outcome distribution F2 (x2) such that all first-period
news is concealed in all monotonic equilibria.16
It might also be expected that relaxing either of two assumptions, that outcomes x1 and x2
are independent, or that payoffs are linear in market beliefs (equation 2), would affect reputational
incentives and equilibrium disclosure. Positive correlation between outcomes might arise from
symmetric uncertainty about average project quality. Given assumption A1, it is straightforward
to introduce simple forms of correlation. For example, modify the game by assuming that outcomes
xt follow an AR(1) process: xt = αxt−1 +et. Assume that x0 is common knowledge at the beginning
of the game and innovations et are independent with distributions Ft.
In period t, the market can infer the innovation et from a disclosed outcome xt. Hence, although
the firm actually chooses whether or not to disclose outcomes xt, this is equivalent to a game in which
the firm chooses whether or not to disclose innovations et. Since et are independent, and reduced
form payoffs in equation (3) reduce further to Πˆ = E [e1| r1] + δE [e2| r1, r2, e1],17 all preceding
results apply directly to the version of the game with disclosure of et. Disclosure is independent
of α and hence of the degree of correlation between x1 and x2 as long as the distributions of et
remain the same. At the same time, if x1 and x2 are perfectly correlated (so e2 is a constant) then
the two period disclosure game reduces to a single period disclosure game in which the standard
sanitization result applies. What matters for the strength of reputational incentives in the first
period is not the correlation between x1 and x2, but rather the amount of new information that
arrives with x2.
Returning to the case of independently distributed outcomes, the assumption of linear pay-
16Let Fˆ2 (x2) = F2
(
x2−µ2
β
+ µ2
)
for β ≥ 1. Fˆ2 is a mean preserving spread of F2, and for β sufficiently large,
reputational concerns will always outweigh the desire to disclose any good news in the first period.
17For the Section 3.1 example of a firm communicating with investors, the discount rate in the reduced form payoffs
should be modified to δˆ = δ/ (1 + α) since E [x2| I1] is a function of e1.
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offs can also be relaxed. The primary results in Section 4 and Appendix A, including Proposi-
tions 1-4 and 6-7 are easily extended to the more general payoff function Π = u1 (E [x1|I1]) +
u2 (E [x1|I2] , E [x2|I2]) for u1 and u2 strictly increasing and continuous, and u2 additively separa-
ble. Costly improvements in reputation, achieved by concealing good news or disclosing bad news,
are similar to insurance purchases. First period payoffs decrease by a fixed amount, but improved
reputation increases the lower bound of second period payoffs. As a result, risk aversion will in-
crease reputational incentives. This will increase concealment of good news and, in non-monotonic
equilibria, increase the disclosure of bad news.
4.4 Equilibrium Informativeness
Strictly speaking, welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper since the reduced form model
does not specify receiver payoffs. The two examples that do fully specify player preferences (seller
communicating to buyers, and firm communicating to investors) are zero sum games, so welfare is
constant. For instance in the firm communicating to investors example, trades take place due to
liquidity reasons irrespective of disclosure. Disclosure only affects transaction prices, not trades, and
hence only the distribution of surplus between existing and new shareholders, not total surplus.
Moreover, existing shareholders always receive a fair price on average, regardless of the level of
disclosure in equilibrium.18
When forecasting errors cause poor decisions that result in welfare losses, then all else equal,
welfare will be increasing in the amount of information revealed in equilibrium. For instance, sup-
pose that each period t, receivers make a decision dt ∈ R to maximize a payoff −
∑2
t=1 (xt − dt)2.
Receivers’ optimal action is to choose dt = E [xt | It], and expected welfare is the expected sum of
negative square errors E[−∑2t=1 (xt − E [xt | It])2], which is one measure of equilibrium informa-
tiveness. The primary result from comparing equilibria or interventions using this or other similar
measures of equilibrium informativeness is that there is often a trade-off between information rev-
elation in periods one and two.
For instance, are minimum or maximum disclosure equilibria more informative? While the max-
imum disclosure equilibrium is more informative about x1 in period one, it can be less informative
about θ in period one and hence less informative about x2 in period two. This trade-off arises
because a low type’s choice to conceal good news about x1 can help the market distinguish firm
types, and better interpret period two nondisclosure. How the trade-off is resolved will depend not
18Although on average firms are priced fairly by the market, this is not true conditional on firm type. On average
low-type firms are undervalued in the short run, and high-type firms are overvalued.
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only on outcome distributions (F1, F2) and model parameters (L, H, q, δ), but also on the measure
of equilibrium informativeness.
Some interventions would unambiguously increase monotonic equilibrium informativeness. The
underlying reason that nonproprietary news is strategically concealed is that firms can neither cred-
ibly communicate that news is non-disclosable, nor that they are the low type with a low probability
of receiving disclosable news. Interventions or institutions which solve this communication problem
will unambiguously increase monotonic equilibrium informativeness. For instance, suppose that at
time zero, for a small cost c > 0, firms could commit to disclose all future nonproprietary news
and hire a third party auditor to verify their adherence to the disclosure policy. The auditor solves
the communication problem by certifying nondisclosures conceal only proprietary information. In
equilibrium, low-type firms would hire the auditor and disclose all nonproprietary information.
High-type firms would identify themselves by not hiring the auditor, and disclose nonproprietary
news above the threshold x¯S(H,Ft) each period.
19 The difficulty is that it may be impossible for an
outsider, whether a court or an auditor, to distinguish proprietary from nonproprietary information.
5 Equilibrium with indefinite disclosure delay (A2)
When information disclosure can be delayed indefinitely, the firm’s objective function is given by
equation (7). For simplicity I will focus on the special case in which the low-type never receives
nonproprietary news (L = 0), and hence is not a strategic player in the game.20
Πˆ = E [x1| r1] + δE
[
x1 + x2|r1, r′1, r2
]
(7)
Analysis of first-period disclosure is similar to that under one-period delay, although rather than
mixing, the high-type discloses nonproprietary signal x1 if it exceeds a threshold xH .
21 However,
an analysis of second-period disclosure must account for at least two important differences. First,
if x1 is not disclosed in period one, the firm must choose again in period two whether to disclose
19Hiring an auditor guarantees an expected payoff of µ1 + δµ2 − c for any firm. Without an auditor, high types
always receive an expected payoff of at least µ1 + δµ2, while low types expect strictly less if the market puts positive
probability on their being a high-type. Hence for small enough c, low types hire the auditor.
20Assuming L = 0 ensures that all equilibria are monotonic because any disclosure reveals the firm to be the
high-type. Allowing for L strictly greater than zero would complicate the analysis in two respects: (1) There would
be greater multiplicity of equilibria, including non-monotonic equilibria with disclosure of bad news. (2) It would be
possible for a low-type to signal its type by delaying the disclosure of good news by one period, and then revealing
it. (This is effective if high-types with nonproprietary news disclose immediately.)
21The high-type does not mix because the market’s beliefs about the firm’s type do not vary with the outcome
when it is concealed indefinitely.
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x1. Denote the firm’s second-period disclosure about x1 by r
′
1 ∈ {φ, s1}. Second, it is no longer
necessarily in the firm’s best interest to disclose nonproprietary good news about the second project.
The firm may prefer to conceal nonproprietary good news about the second project to reduce
skepticism about the nondisclosure of the first project outcome.
A first-period disclosure of x1 reveals nothing about x2, since during the first period x2 is
unknown to the firm, but it does demonstrate with certainty that the firm is a high-type. Thus,
following a first-period disclosure, the second-period continuation game is identical to a static
disclosure game with market belief θ¯ = H, and the firm discloses x2 if and only if it is good news,
exceeding the static threshold x¯S2 ≡ xS (H,F2). If nothing is disclosed in the first period, then the
second-period continuation game is similar to the disclosure game analyzed by Pae (2005).22
Following initial nondisclosure, the firm has up to four available second-period actions, cor-
responding to disclosure of x1, x2, neither, or both, as summarized in Table 1. For a firm with
a0 a1 a2 a3
r′1
r2
φ
φ
x1
φ
φ
x2
x1
x2
Table 1: Second period actions following first period non-disclosure.
two nonproprietary signals, conditional on disclosing one signal xj , the second signal xi will be
disclosed only if it exceeds the market’s expectation of xi in absence of the additional disclosure:
E [xi| aj ]. I focus on equilibria in which E [xi| aj ] is independent of xj both on and off the equi-
librium path. (I discuss relaxing this assumption at the end of the section.) In such equilibria,
the threshold E [xi| aj ] is equal to the static game disclosure threshold x¯Si ≡ xS (H,Fi) given mar-
ket belief θ¯ = H. This is intuitive, because revealing one outcome reveals the firm’s type and
leaves the firm with the remaining objective of maximizing the market’s expectation of the second
outcome. When both outcomes are concealed however, the market believes the firm may be a
low-type. Hence, there is a positive credibility ”bonus” ∆ for two nondisclosures relative to market
expectations when one outcome is revealed and one is concealed:
∆ ≡ E [x1 + x2| a0]− (E [x1| a2] + E [x2| a1]) . (8)
So, conditional on the decision to conceal one outcome xj , the firm reveals the other outcome, xi,
only if it exceeds x¯Si by at least ∆. Thus, as described in Table 2, firms with a single nonproprietary
22Pae’s (2005) equilibrium characterization does not apply to my second period continuation game for two reasons.
First, taking my second period continuation game in isolation, there are important differences in signal structure and
other aspects of our two games. Second, I cannot solve my second period continuation game in isolation, but rather
must solve for first and second period disclosure strategies simultaneously.
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signal xi disclose above the threshold x¯
S
i +∆, firms with two nonproprietary signals disclose following
the strategy depicted in Figure 3, and firms with two proprietary signals disclose nothing.
a (φ, φ) = a0
a (xi, φ) =
{
a0 xi < x¯
S
i + ∆
ai xi ≥ x¯Si + ∆
a (x1, x2) =

a0 otherwise
a1 x1 ≥ x¯S1 + ∆ and x2 ≤ x¯S2
a2 x2 ≥ x¯S2 + ∆ and x1 ≤ x¯S1
a3
x1 ≥ x¯S1 , x2 ≥ x¯S2
& x1 + x2 ≥ x¯S1 + x¯S2 + ∆
Table 2: Second period strategies following r1 = φ.
A2. Pd 2 Strategy
2x
B2
Sx2
ΔSx2+
a2
a3
B1A1
Sx1 ΔSx1+
A2
a0
a1
1x
Hx
Figure 3: Second period disclosure strategy, following first period non-disclosure (r1 = φ) given two
nonproprietary signals (s1, s2) = (x1, x2). Note that this continuation game is off the equilibrium
path for x1 > xH (to the right of the vertical dashed line) since such high values of x1 would have
been disclosed in the first period.
Since the credibility ”bonus” ∆ is forfeited with the announcement of either outcome, disclosures
will tend to be all-or-nothing. This captures the idea that Tony Blair should have had an extra
incentive to refuse to answer additional questions about his children to avoid undermining the
credibility of his refusal to talk about Leo’s vaccination history. Moreover, since the first-period
disclosure threshold xH falls between x¯
S
1 and x¯
S
1 + ∆, in equilibrium the firm may initially conceal
x1, but then reveal both x1 and x2 in the second period (Figure 3). Therefore undisclosed news
may accumulate before being disclosed all at the same time. This suggests that had Tony Blair
begun to answer other personal questions about his children, he might have disclosed Leo’s vaccine
record at the same time. Proposition 5 precisely summarizes the described equilibrium:
Proposition 5 There exists a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which: (1) In period
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one, s1 = x1 is disclosed if and only if x1 ≥ xH for some threshold xH ∈
[
x¯S1 , x¯
S
1 + ∆
]
. (2) If x1
is disclosed in period one, then in period two, s2 = x2 is disclosed if and only if x2 ≥ x¯S2 . (3) If
x1 is concealed in period one, then in period two: (i) Market expectations E [x1| a2] and E [x2| a1]
are constants equal to x¯S1 = x
S (H,F1) and x¯
S
2 = x
S (H,F2) respectively. The difference ∆ is also
constant, and is positive. (ii) Firm strategy is as described in Table 2 and Figure 3, as a function
of the signals s1 and s2, as well as xH and ∆. (4) The constants xH and ∆ ≥ 0 are jointly
characterized by equation (8) and equations (23-29) in Appendix B.4.
This equilibrium (or set of equilibria) is the only one in which E [x1| a2] and E [x2| a1] are
constant (up to changes in the strategy at the thresholds of indifference).
In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 5, the market expectations following partial
disclosure, E [x1| a2] and E [x2| a1], are constants independent of the disclosed outcome, even if the
revelation is off the equilibrium path. By selecting alternate off-equilibrium beliefs for these two
expectations, alternate equilibria may be supported in which partial-disclosure actions a1 and a2
are taken less frequently, in favor of either no-disclosure or full-disclosure actions a0 and a3. In such
alternative equilibria the tendency towards all-or-nothing disclosure would be more pronounced,
however I find them less plausible than that described by Proposition 5. I conjecture that there
are no equilibria in which E [xi| aj ] vary on the equilibrium path.23
6 Discussion
In many situations, there is positive probability that disclosure is prohibited for exogenous reasons.
This may be due to a lack of information, a value of keeping competitors in the dark, or other direct
disclosure costs. Jung and Kwon (1988) and Shin (1994, 2003) show that in this case the unraveling
result partially unravels, and senders’ may strategically conceal bad news. This paper shows that
the credibility with which such nondisclosure is received depends on the likelihood receivers attach
to exogenous causes of nondisclosure. Thus, when there is uncertainty about senders’ exogenous
reticence, senders have an incentive to develop a reputation for reticence.
The model is analyzed under two assumptions, the first of which allows for one-period disclosure
delay (A1), and the second of which allows for indefinitely delayed disclosure (A2). In both cases,
firms may withhold good news about an initial project in order to protect their credibility in future
23This is not obvious. The expectation E [x2| r1 = x1, r2 = φ] is constant because the choice r1 = x1 is made
without private information about x2, so it can only be informative about θ, not x2. When r1 = φ but r
′
1 = x1, the
decision to reveal x1 in period two is conditional on both x1 and new information about x2. Hence, the particular
value of x1 revealed could be informative about x2.
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nondisclosures. Moreover, the increased credibility achieved by concealing good news initially leads
to reduced future disclosure.
Under A1, the model is analyzed with two strategic types, and there exist equilibria in which bad
news is sometimes revealed to signal that the firm receives nonproprietary information infrequently.
This may explain the frequency with which firms release bad news early (Skinner 1994). Such
early revelations may help persuade the market that future nondisclosures do not hide more bad
news. These equilibria are supported by the intuitive criterion, yet intuitively appealing monotonic
equilibria in which all bad news is concealed always exist.
Under A2, senders may withhold good news about a second project in order to protect the
credibility of a prior nondisclosure. Thus, the desire to improve the credibility of both future and
past nondisclosures may motivate the withholding of good news. In all cases, firms are more likely
to choose nondisclosure when the good news is only moderately better than market expectations,
and more likely to disclose when good news is exceptionally better than market expectations.
Nevertheless, in some situations, firms that receive nonproprietary information infrequently may
initially conceal all news, however exceptional it may be.
The model may apply to communication in several settings, such as communication between
politicians and their constituents, or communication between sellers and their customers. An
application highlighted in this paper is that of a firm making disclosures to investors. Since public
companies cannot suppress results indefinitely, assumption A1 is likely to be most appropriate
in this setting. In this case, the results closely match the views expressed by surveyed financial
executives (Graham et al. 2005) that they limit voluntary disclosures to avoid setting a precedent
for future disclosures.
Reputational incentives rely on underlying uncertainty. Thus, suppression of good news is most
likely in the model when management’s possible types L and H are very different, and there is
uncertainty about the true type. Uncertainty around θ might be present for companies with short
reporting histories, such as those that have recently been formed by merger or become public, or
for companies that have recently changed, for instance by hiring a new chief financial officer or
acquiring a new division. Thus, it should not be surprising that Google made its choice not to issue
earnings guidance at its IPO, or that Houston, Lev and Tucker (2008) find cessation of earnings
guidance is associated with a change in top management.
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A Equilibrium Characterization Given A1
The importance of firm reputation follows from the firm’s second-period expected payoff Π2 (equa-
tion 5). The firm’s second-period payoff is increasing in the threshold x¯2 (equation 9) and therefore
decreasing in investors’ expectation θ¯
′
, since by the implicit function theorem x¯2 is decreasing in θ¯
′
(equation 10 and Jung and Kwon’s (1988) Proposition 2).
dΠ2
dx¯2
= 1− θ (1− F2 (x¯2)) > 0 (9)
dx¯2
dθ¯
′ = −
(F2 (x¯2) x¯2 + (1− F2 (x¯2))E [x2|x2 > x¯2])− x¯2
1− θ¯′ (1− F2 [x¯2])
< 0 (10)
Moreover, reputation is most important for the low-type, due to the endogenous single crossing
property:
d2Π2
dθdθ¯
′ = −
dx¯2
dθ¯
′ (1− F2 (x¯2)) > 0. (11)
The market’s posterior belief q′ = Pr (θ = H| r1, x1) about the firm’s type captures the impact
of disclosure on reputation. On the equilibrium path, Bayes’ rule pins down posterior beliefs
following a first-period choice to reveal (qr) or to conceal (qc) as a function of the outcome x1
and the equilibrium firm strategy (equations 12 and 13). These posterior beliefs correspond to
second-period disclosure thresholds x¯c (x1) and x¯r (x1) via equation (4).
qr (x1) = q
HσH (x1)
qHσH (x1) + (1− q)LσL (x1) (12)
qc (x1) = q
1−HσH (x1)
1− (qHσH (x1) + (1− q)LσL (x1)) (13)
For a strategy to be optimal, it must satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions in equations
(14-15), where Π2 (θ, q
′) denotes expected second-period payoffs given true type θ and updated
market belief q′. The left hand side of these incentive constraints measures the immediate im-
pact of revealing outcome x1, while the right hand side captures the second-period reputational
ramifications of concealing x1.
Disclosure IC: x1 − x¯1 ≥ δ {Π2 (θ, qc (x1))−Π2 (θ, qr (x1))} ∀θ, x1 s.t. σθ (x1) > 0 (14)
Concealment IC: x1 − x¯1 ≤ δ {Π2 (θ, qc (x1))−Π2 (θ, qr (x1))} ∀θ, x1 s.t. σθ (x1) < 1 (15)
Good news yields an immediate disclosure benefit, but will be concealed if there is a sufficiently
strong reputational cost of disclosure. Since the low-type L values reputational improvements
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strictly more than the high-type (Proposition 1 and equation 11), whenever the high-type is willing
to conceal good news, the low-type must strictly prefer nondisclosure (equation 16). Similarly,
firms will only reveal bad news to improve firm reputation. Hence, if the high-type is willing to
reveal bad news, then the low-type will strictly prefer to do so (equation 17).
∀x1 > x¯1 : σH (x1) < 1→ σL (x1) = 0 (16)
∀x1 < x¯1 : σH (x1) > 0→ σL (x1) = 1 (17)
A.1 Monotonic Equilibria
Define Rθ (σL, σH) as the second-period reputational benefit to type θ for concealing any outcome
that the market believes is disclosed with probabilities (σL, σH), assuming off-equilibrium belief
qr = 1 for σ = (0, 0). This is the right hand side of the IC constraints (14-15),24 which depends on
the firm’s disclosure policy through qr and qc given by Bayes’ rule (equations 12-13).
Rθ (σL, σH) ≡ δ {Π2 (θ, qc (σL, σH))−Π2 (θ, qr (σL, σH))}
(assuming qr(0,0)=1)
Note that Rθ (σL, σH) is strictly decreasing in σL and Rθ (σL, σH) is strictly increasing in σH . As
a result, multiple equilibria arise from variation in the low-type’s strategy, but given a particular
strategy for the low-type, that for the high-type is pinned down. All monotonic equilibria lie
somewhere between two extremes: the minimum and maximum monotonic-disclosure equilibria.
In the former the low-type discloses only above the threshold x¯1 +RL (0, 1), while in the latter the
low-type begins disclosing at the lower threshold x¯1 +RL (1, 1).
If the market expects both types to disclose outcome x1 whenever it is nonproprietary, then the
reputational benefit to the low-type for concealing x1 is RL (1, 1). This is the smallest premium
above the market’s expectation x¯1 at which the low-type can disclose news in equilibrium. However
if the market expects the high-type and only the high-type to disclose x1, then the reputational
benefit to the low-type for concealing x1 is larger: RL (0, 1) > RL (1, 1). This is the largest premium
above x¯1 at which the low-type can conceal news in equilibrium. For good outcomes that exceed
x¯1 by an amount between these two premia, either full disclosure, complete concealment, or mixing
by the low-type can be consistent with equilibrium.
Any outcome disclosed by the low-type in equilibrium must also be disclosed by the high-type
(equation 16). For outcomes concealed by the low-type, the high-type gradually switches from full
24For any x1 at which (σL (x1) , σH (x1)) = (σL, σH).
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concealment to full disclosure over the range [x¯1 +RH (0, 0) , x¯1 +RH (0, 1)], mixing so as to be
indifferent between revealing and concealing outcomes: x1 = x¯1 + RH (0, σH). In the minimum-
disclosure equilibrium, the single crossing property guarantees that the high-type begins complete
disclosure of outcomes before the low-type (RL (0, 1) > RH (0, 1) by equation 11). However, the
ranking between RL (1, 1) and either RH (0, 1) or RH (0, 0) will vary depending on model parameters
q, L, and H, and distributions F1 and F2. If the low-type’s maximum-disclosure threshold x¯1 +
RL (1, 1) is below x¯1 +RH (0, 1), as in Figure 1, the high-type will jump to full disclosure with the
low-type at x¯1 +RL (1, 1) in the maximum disclosure equilibrium.
Proposition 6 and Solutions 1-2 give a precise characterization of both minimum and maximum
monotonic-disclosure equilibria.
Proposition 6 Solutions 1 and 2 respectively characterize the monotonic equilibria with minimum
and maximum disclosure in the first period among all monotonic equilibria. Both equilibria exist
and are unique. Minimum-disclosure equilibrium thresholds can be strictly ranked: RH (0, 0) <
RH (0, 1) < RL (0, 1), but the ranking of maximum disclosure equilibrium thresholds depends on
parameters. In the minimum (maximum) disclosure monotonic-equilibrium, market expectation x¯1
is at a maximum (minimum) across all monotonic equilibria.
Solution 1 Minimum-disclosure monotonic equilibrium:
(1) Describe equilibrium strategies as a function of the market expectation x¯1:
σˆH (x1) =

0 , x1 ≤ x¯1 +RH (0, 0)
z : x1 = x¯1 +RH (0, z) otherwise
1 , x1 ≥ x¯1 +RH (0, 1)
σminL (x1) =
 0 , x1 ≤ x¯1 +RL (0, 1)1 , x1 > x¯1 +RL (0, 1) ; σminH (x1) = σˆH (x1)
(2) Determine equilibrium market expectation x¯1: Step (1) defines firm strategy {σminL (x1) ,
σminH (x1)} as a function of x¯1. Equation (6) gives x¯1 as a function of firm strategy. Select the
maximum fixed point x¯1 that is self-consistent. This market expectation x¯1 and the associated
strategy form the minimum-disclosure equilibrium. (The market’s beliefs are given by Bayes’ rule
on the equilibrium path, while the market’s belief is q′ = 1 off the equilibrium-path.)
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Solution 2 Maximum-disclosure monotonic equilibrium:
σmaxL (x1) =
 0 , x1 < x¯1 +RL (1, 1)1 , x1 ≥ x¯1 +RL (1, 1) ; σmaxH (x1) =
 σˆH (x1) , σmaxL (x1) = 01 , σmaxL (x1) > 0
Select the minimum fixed point x¯1 that is self-consistent with σ
max (x1) and equation (6).
A.1.1 Comparative Statics
The level of disclosure in both minimum and maximum disclosure equilibria depends on outcome
distributions and other model parameters. Concealing first period good news is motivated by a
concern for the future, and hence more good news can be concealed in equilibrium for higher δ.
The reputational incentives to conceal good news rely on market uncertainty about the firm’s type.
When there is no uncertainty, because L = H or q = 1, first period disclosure conforms to the
static sanitization strategy. The same is true in the maximum disclosure equilibrium for q = 0,
but not for the minimum disclosure equilibrium, which supports concealment of good news with
the off-equilibrium belief qr = 1 even for q = 0. As a result, disclosure in the maximum-disclosure
equilibrium is minimized for intermediate q ∈ (0, 1), but disclosure is increasing monotonically in
q in the minimum-disclosure equilibrium.
Disclosure by both types in both minimum and maximum disclosure equilibria is increasing
in L for three reasons. First, as L increases more news is disclosable, and hence more news is
disclosed holding strategies fixed. Second, conditional on receiving disclosable good news, second
period reputational benefits for concealing it are muted because (a) the two types L and H are less
different (reducing RL and RH) and (b) the low-type expects to conceal second period news less
often (reducing RL). Thus the interval of good news above x¯1 that is concealed shrinks. Third, the
increased disclosure of good news due to the first two effects makes concealed news less credible, so
that x¯1 decreases. The analysis for changes in H is the same, except that increasing H increases the
difference between types, which increases the value of a good reputation conditional on concealing
information in the second period. (This does not mean that RH is increasing in H, however, as
increasing H also reduces the likelihood that the high type will need to conceal second period news.)
As a result, disclosure may increase or decrease with H.
Without loss of generality, let xt = µt + σtεt for independent mean zero random variables εt,
and constants µt. Shifting distributions of x1 or x2 up or down by a constant by varying µt has no
effect on disclosure and can simply be considered a normalization. Scaling up the uncertainty about
x2 by increasing σ2 reduces disclosure, and is equivalent to increasing δ. Scaling up uncertainty
about x1 by increasing σ1 has the opposite effect. Other shifts in the distributions of x1 and x2
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have more ambiguous effects on disclosure.
A.2 Non-Monotonic Equilibria
Condition 1 Given market expectation x¯1, bad news disclosure strategies are:
σbadL (x1) =
 0 , x1 < x¯1 +RL (1, 0)1 , x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RL (1, 0) , x¯1)
σbadH (x1) =
 0 , x1 ≤ x¯1 +RH (1, 0)z : x1 = x¯1 +RH (1, z) , x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RH (1, 0) , x¯1)
Remark 1 The disclosure of the widest possible interval of bad news is obtained by any equilibrium
for which Condition 1 is satisfied for all x1 < x¯1. Given a uniform distribution of x1, and threshold
x¯1+RL (1, 0) not less than A1, this also corresponds to the greatest probability of bad news disclosure.
Proposition 7 Define RD1 to be the reputational benefit to the low-type for concealing an outcome
neither type reveals (σ = (0, 0)) given the off-equilibrium belief qr = 0. (Recall Rθ (0, 0) is calculated
assuming off-equilibrium belief qr = 1.)
RD1 ≡ δ {Π2 (L, q)−Π2 (L, 0)} < 0
An equilibrium satisfies the D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987, Banks and Sobel 1987, Cho and
Sobel 1990), appropriately defined for this setting, if and only if Condition 1 is met in the range
x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1). An equilibrium satisfies the weaker intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987)
if and only if Condition 1 is met in the range x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1 +RH (1, 0)). Multiple Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria that meet Condition 1 for x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1) exist.
Proposition 4 is an immediate corollary of Proposition 7: The D1 criterion always rules out
monotonic equilibria in favor of non-monotonic equilibria. Monotonic equilibria are also ruled out
by the weaker intuitive criterion given parameters for which RD1 < RH (1, 0).
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25Cho and Kreps’s (1987) intuitive criterion and Banks and Sobel’s (1987) divine equilibrium require only that
negative off-equilibrium disclosures be seen as no more likely to be from the high-type than the low-type (qr ≤ q)
when the high-type could also benefit for some inference. Thus, they would not rule out concealment of bad news in
the range x1 ∈ (x¯1 + max{RD1, RH (1, 0)}, x¯1), but they would still require disclosure of bad news by the low type in
the range x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1 +RH (1, 0)). Therefore monotonic equilibria are not ruled out when RD1 > RH (1, 0).
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Follows from Appendix A, equations (9-11).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Part (1): At any good outcome x1 > x¯1 for which at least one type discloses with strictly positive
probability, beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule and equation (16) applies. Together these imply:
qc (x1) ≤ q < qHθ¯ ≤ qr (x1). Hence there is a strict reputational benefit of delayed disclosure for
each type of at least γ ≡ δ{Π2 (H, q)−Π2(H, qHθ¯ )} > 0. Thus for any x1 ∈ (x¯1, x¯1 + γ), good news
must always be suppressed by both types.
Part (2): The sanitization strategy of only disclosing good news is the strategy that minimizes
the consistent market expectation x¯1 over all possible disclosure strategies (equation 6). This
follows since either concealing good news or revealing bad news raises the average of the pool of
undisclosed information. By assumption, the outcome distribution has full support. Together with
part (1) of the proposition, this implies that good news is concealed with positive probability in all
equilibria. Hence x¯1 > x¯
S
1 in all equilibria.
B.3 Proof of Propositions 3-4
Proposition 3: See Proposition 6 in Appendix A and discussion in the text. Proposition 4: Follows
from Proposition 7 and Condition 1 in Appendix A which characterize the set of equilibria that
pass the D1 and Intuitive criteria.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Given first-period nondisclosure, let second-period market expectations be denoted by: (i) y¯ ≡
E [x1 + x2| a0], (ii) x¯′1 ≡ E [x1| a2], and (iii) x¯2 ≡ E [x2| a1]. Let a candidate second-period
strategy be described by Table 3. (This matches that in Table 2 if x¯′1 = x¯S1 and x¯2 = x¯S2 .) Finally,
define σi (s1, s2) to be the probability of taking second-period action ai conditional on receiving
signals (s1, s2) and first-period report r1 = φ.
B.4.1 First, I prove a Lemma.
Lemma 1 Given x¯′1 and x¯2 are constant, a threshold strategy in period one, and the second-period
strategy described in Table 3: (1) E [x2| a0] ≥ x¯S2 = xS (H,F2), and (2) E [x1| a0] ≥ xˆS1 , where xˆS1
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a (φ, φ) = a0
a (xi, φ) =
{
a0 xi < x¯i + ∆
ai xi ≥ x¯i + ∆
a (x1, x2) =

a0 otherwise
a1 x1 ≥ x¯′1 + ∆ and x2 ≤ x¯2
a2 x2 ≥ x¯2 + ∆ and x1 ≤ x¯′1
a3
x1 ≥ x¯′1, x2 ≥ x¯2
& x1 + x2 ≥ x¯′1 + x¯2 + ∆
Table 3: Second period strategies following r1 = φ.
is characterized by equation (18).
xˆS1 =
(1−H)µ1 +HF1
[
min
{
xˆS1 , xH
}]
E
[
x1|x1 ≤ min
{
xˆS1 , xH
}]
(1−H) +HF1
[
min
{
xˆS1 , xH
}] (18)
Proof. (1) Under the proposed strategy, action a0 is taken in period two under a subset of two
separate events: (E1) θ = L and (E2) θ = H and s1 ∈ {φ} ∪ {x1 : x1 ≤ min {x¯′1 + ∆, xH}}. As a
result, E [x2| a0] is the weighted average of two quantities, given below in equations (19-20),26 each
of which is weakly greater than x¯S2 :
E [x2| a0, E1] = µ2 ≥ x¯S2 (19)
E [x2| a0, E2] = (1−H)µ2 +HEx2 [x2σ0 (x2|E2)]
(1−H) +HEx2 [σ0 (x2|E2)]
≥ x¯S2 (20)
σ0 (x2|E2) ≡ Es1 [σ0 (s1, x2)|x2, E2]
Given event E2, s2 = φ occurs with probability (1−H). In this case, action a0 is taken with
certainty, which leads to the term (1−H)µ2 in equation 20. On the other hand, s2 equals x2 with
probability H, and in this case, action a0 will be taken with probability σ0 (x2|E2) as specified
by the proposed strategy. The resulting expression is weakly greater than x¯S2 = x
S (H,F2), since
it takes the same form as E
[
x| r = φ, θ¯ = H,σ] in a one variable static game. By Proposition 2,
xS
(
θ¯, F
)
is the minimum attained by E
[
x| r = φ, θ¯, σ] over all possible strategies σ.
(2) Under the proposed strategy, action a0 is taken in period two under a subset of two separate
events: (E1) θ = L and (E3) θ = H and s2 ∈ {φ} ∪ {x2 : x2 ≤ x¯2 + ∆}. As a result, E [x1| a0] is
the weighted average of two quantities, given below in equations (21-22), each of which is weakly
greater than xˆS1 :
E [x1| a0, E1] = µ1 ≥ xˆS1 (21)
E [x1| a0, E3] = (1−H)µ1 +HF1 (xH)Ex1 [x1σ0 (x1|E3)|x1 ≤ xH ]
(1−H) +HF1 (xH)Ex1 [σ0 (x1|E3)|x1 ≤ xH ]
≥ xˆS1 (22)
26Implicitly, σ0 depends on x¯1, x¯2, and ∆.
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σ0 (x1|E3) = Es2 [σ0 (x1, s2)|x1, E3]
The argument here is similar to that for E [x2| a0]. The comparison µ1 ≥ xˆS1 follows directly
from inspection of equation (18), which characterizes xˆS1 . The expression for E [x1| a0, E3] is
not symmetric to E [x2| a0, E2] due to the first-period threshold strategy. Nevertheless, it is still
minimized by the strategy of concealing x1 (σ0 = 1) if and only if x1 ≤ E [x1| a0, E3]. For this
strategy, the expression reduces to that for xˆS1 in equation (18). Hence it must be that for any
σ0 (x1|E3), E [x1| a0, E3] ≥ xˆS1 .
B.4.2 Now I prove the proposition.
Proof. (1) Period 2 strategy following initial disclosure: If the firm discloses x1 in period one, it
reveals itself to be type H. In the following period, further disclosures about x1 are irrelevant, and
disclosure of x2 is identical to that in a 1 variable 1 period game where the market belief is θ¯ = H.
Hence s2 = x2 is disclosed if and only if x2 ≥ x¯S2 = xS (H,F2). Further, second-period payoffs are
µ2 on average, since in this case the market has correct beliefs about the firm’s type. Expected
payoffs from revealing x1 initially are then:
pi (r1 = x1) = (1 + δ) (x1 + µ2)
(2) Period 2 strategy following initial concealment: The second-period strategy described in
Table 3 is optimal following r1 = φ if x¯i is a constant (independent of xj) for i ∈ {1, 2} and ∆ ≥ 0.
(It is uniquely optimal up to variations at points of indifference, which are measure zero). This
follows simply by comparing the payoffs from each action given in Table 4.
a a0 a1 a2 a3
Π2 x¯
′
1 + x¯2 + ∆ x1 + x¯2 x¯
′
1 + x2 x1 + x2
Table 4: Second Period Payoffs Following r1=phi
First consider a (x1, φ), referring to the payoffs in the table above. The payoff from a1 is better
than that from a0 if and only if x1 ≥ (x¯′1 + ∆). (a (φ, x2) is symmetric). Second, consider a (x1, x2).
For a1 to be chosen, it must still be the case that a1  a0, but it must now also be the case that
a1  a3 and a1  a2. These require not only that x1 ≥ (x¯′1 + ∆) but also that x¯2 ≥ x2 and that
x1 + x¯2 ≥ x¯′1 + x2. The last requirement is redundant to the first two, for ∆ ≥ 0. For a2 to be
chosen, the requirements are symmetric. For a3 to be chosen, it must be better than a1 and a2,
and therefore x2 ≥ x¯2 and x1 ≥ x¯ are required. Moreover, a3 must be better than a0, which is the
case when (x1 + x2) ≥ (x¯′1 + x¯2 + ∆).
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(3) Period 1 strategy: Given x¯2 = E [x2| a1] is a constant independent x1, the firm must use
a threshold strategy in period one, disclosing s1 = x1 only if x1 ≥ xH .27 This is apparent by
comparing first derivatives of expected payoffs from revealing or concealing in period one:
d
dx1
pi (r1 = x1) = (1 + δ) > 1
d
dx1
pi (r1 = φ|x1) = δ · Pr
(
r′1 = x1
∣∣ r1 = φ, x1) < 1
Note that the expression for ddx1pi (r1 = φ|x1) relies on ddx1E [x2| a1] = 0.
(4) x¯2 = x¯
S
2 and x¯
′
1 = xˆ
S
1 : Given x¯i are constants, ∆ ≥ 0, and the described strategy, the ex-
pression characterizing x¯2 is identical to that which uniquely characterizes the 1 variable 1 period
static cutoff for belief θ¯ = H and distribution F2:
E [x2| a1] = x¯2 = (1−H)µ2 +HF2 [x¯2]E [x2|x2 ≤ x¯2]
(1−H) +HF2 [x¯2]
Hence x¯2 = x
S (H,F2) = x¯
S
2 . The expressions are identical because there is (1−H) chance x2 is
not reportable, and H chance that it is. In the later case, observing a1 informs the market that
(i) x1 ≥ (x¯′1 + ∆), (ii) that x2 ≤ x¯2 and (iii) that x1 + x¯2 ≥ x¯′1 + x2. The third restriction is
redundant to the first two, and can be ignored since ∆ ≥ 0. Hence the relevant information given
active choice to conceal x2 is that x2 ≤ x¯2, which is precisely what is known following nondisclosure
in the one-variable static game.
The expression characterizing x¯′1 is similar, but differs due to the threshold strategy in period
one:
E [x1| a2] = x¯′1 =
(1−H)µ1 +HF1 [min {x¯′1, xH}]E [x1|x1 ≤ min {x¯′1, xH}]
(1−H) +HF1 [min {x¯′1, xH}]
Although this expression differs slightly, it will still have a unique solution, and by comparison to
equation (18) it is clear that it is x¯′1 = xˆS1 .
(5) Two (sets of) equations and two unknowns: We already know that xˆS1 and x¯
S
2 exist and are
unique (equation 18 defines xˆ1 as a function of xH). There are two remaining unknowns: ∆ and xH .
(a) Equations for ∆: The expectation E [x1 + x2| a0] can be calculated as a function of the strat-
egy described by x¯′1, x¯2, ∆ and xH in Table 3. This calculation is captured by the following
four equations (23-26). By equation (8), this implies a value for ∆ which must be consistent in
27Note that I do not need to worry about influencing equilibrium selection in period 2 with first period disclosure,
since following any positive disclosure in period 1, the equilibrium in period 2 is unique. The potential multiplicity
only arises given concealment. However, when x1 is concealed, its exact value cannot influence selection.
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equilibrium.
E [x1| a0] = 1
η1

{(1− q) + q (1−H) [(1−H) +HF2 (x¯2 + ∆)]}µ1
+q (1−H)HF1 (xH)E [x1|x1 ≤ xH ]
+qH2F1 (xH)
∫ xH
A1
x1
f1(x1)
F1(xH)
F2 (min {x¯2 + ∆, x¯′1 + x¯2 + ∆− x1}) dx1
 (23)
E [x2| a0] = 1
η1

{(1− q) + q (1−H) [(1−H) +HF1 (xH)]}µ1
+q (1−H)HF2 (x¯2 + ∆)E [x2|x2 ≤ x¯2 + ∆]
+qH2
∫ x¯2+∆
A2
x2f2 (x2)F1 (min {xH , x¯′1 + x¯2 + ∆− x2}) dx2
 (24)
η1 ≡ (1− q) + q (1−H)2 + q (1−H)HF2 (x¯2 + ∆) + q (1−H)HF1 (xH) (25)
+ qH2F1 (xH)
∫ xH
A1
f1 (x1)
F1 (xH)
F2
(
min
{
x¯2 + ∆, x¯
′
1 + x¯2 + ∆− x1
})
dx1
η2 ≡ (1− q) + q (1−H)2 + q (1−H)HF1 (xH) + q (1−H)HF2 (x¯2 + ∆) (26)
+ qH2
∫ x¯2+∆
A2
f2 (x2)F1
(
min
{
xH , x¯
′
1 + x¯2 + ∆− x2
})
dx2
(b) Equations for xH : The value of pi (r1 = φ) is calculated as follows:
pi (r1 = φ|x1) =

E [x1| r1 = φ] + δxˆS1 + (1 + δ)µ2
+δ
[
(1−H) +HF2
(
x¯S2 + ∆
)]
∆
x1 < xˆ
S
1
E [x1| r1 = φ] + µ2 + δ [(1−H) +HF2 (y¯ − x1)] y¯
+δH [1− F2 (y¯ − x1)] (x1 + E [x2|x2 ≥ y¯ − x1])
xˆS1 < x1 < xˆ
S
1 + ∆
E [x1| r1 = φ] + δx1 + (1 + δ)µ2 x1 > xˆS1 + ∆
(27)
Given the threshold strategy, E [x1| r1 = φ] is given by:
E [x1| r1 = φ] = [(1− q) + q (1−H)]µ1 + qHF (xH)E [x1|x1 ≤ xH ]
(1− q) + q (1−H) + qHF (xH) (28)
and the threshold xH is characterized by:
xH =
pi (r1 = φ|xH)
1 + δ
− µ2 (29)
(6) Existence (of a solution to the preceding system of equations): Given the proposed strategy,
some starting values of xH ∈ [A1, B1] and ∆ ∈
[
0, 2B1 −
(
xˆS1 + x¯
S
2
)]
, and the values x¯′1 = xˆS1 (xH)
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and x¯2 = x¯
S
2 : (i) The expectation E [x1 + x2| a0] can be computed (equations 23-26), and from this
a new value of ∆′ = E [x1 + x2| a0]−
(
xˆS1 − x¯S2
)
computed. (ii) Further, given the computed value
of E [x1 + x2| a0], pi (r1 = φ|xH) can be computed from equations (27) and (28), and from this a
new value of x′H = max
{
A2,min
{
pi( r1=φ|xH)
(1+δ) − µ2, B1
}}
.
The preceding procedure describes a function mapping {xH ,∆} to {x′H ,∆′}. The function is
continuous since both E [x1 + x2| a0] and pi (r1 = φ) are continuous functions of xH and ∆, given
that F1 and F2 are atomless. The initial pair {xH ,∆} lies within the compact set [A2, B1] ×[
0, 2B1 −
(
xˆS1 + x¯
S
2
)]
. The trick is showing that the resulting pair {x′H ,∆′} does so as well. It is
straightforward that ∆′ ≤ (B1 +B2)−
(
xˆS1 + x¯
S
2
)
, since E [x1 + x2| a0] ∈ [A1 +A2, B1 +B2]. It is
more subtle, however, that ∆′ ≥ 0. This follows from Lemma 1. Next x′H ∈ [A1, B1] by definition.
Limiting x′H to be inside [A1, B1] when
pi( r1=φ|xH)
(1+δ) − µ2 may lie outside is okay, since all thresholds
xH ≥ B1 are equivalent, and all thresholds xH ≤ A1 are equivalent.
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem now applies, and guarantees that there exists at least one pair
{xH ,∆} that form an equilibrium of the two period game when coupled with the proposed strategy,
the values x¯′1 = xˆS1 and x¯2 = x¯S2 .
(7) It is shown that xˆS1 = x¯
S
1 and xH ∈
[
x¯S1 , x¯
S
1 + ∆
]
: (1) Suppose that in equilibrium xH ≥ xˆS1 .
Then xH drops out of equation (18), and xˆ
S
1 = x¯
S
1 . (2) If in equilibrium it is also true that xH
> xˆS1 + ∆ then xH is characterized by E [x1| r1 = φ] + δxH + (1 + δ)µ2 = (1 + δ) (xH + µ2).
This implies xH = E [x1| r1 = φ]. This in turn implies that xH = x¯S1 , which contradicts xH
> xˆS1 + ∆ ≥ xˆS1 = x¯S1 . Therefore in equilibrium xH ≤ xˆS1 + ∆. (3) Suppose in equilibrium that
xH < xˆ
S
1 . Then xˆ
S
1 = E [x1| r1 = φ]. Moreover, xH is characterized by:
xH =
E [x1| r1 = φ] + δxˆS1
(1 + δ)
+
δ
1 + δ
[
(1−H) +HF2
(
x¯S2 + ∆
)]
∆
= xˆS1 +
δ
1 + δ
[
(1−H) +HF2
(
x¯S2 + ∆
)]
∆ ≥ xˆS1
This produces a contradiction. Together, (1)–(3) imply xˆS1 = x¯
S
1 and xH ∈
[
x¯S1 , x¯
S
1 + ∆
]
.
(8) ∆ ≥ 0: All equilibrium conditions developed in steps (1)-(7) were shown to be necessary
conditions given x¯i are constant and ∆ ≥ 0. Moreover, if we assume x¯i are constant and ∆ < 0,
and then calculate x¯i = E [xi| aj ], one immediately finds that x¯i varies with xj , a contradiction.
Hence ∆ ≥ 0 is also necessary given x¯i constant. Therefore, this proposition characterizes the full
set of equilibria for which x¯i are constant. (Again, up to the changes in strategy at measure zero
points of indifference.)
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Existence & Uniqueness: (1) Minimum-disclosure equilibrium: Solution 1 part (1)
specifies an optimal firm strategy as a function x¯1. Plugging this strategy into equation (6) gives
a new x¯′1. Together, this procedure gives a mapping x¯′1 (x¯1) : [A1, B1]→ [A1, B1]. By assumption,
the support [A1, B1] is bounded. The strategies vary continuously with x¯1 everywhere but at
x¯1 +RL (0, 1). Since F1 is atomless, this discontinuity is smoothed out when expectations are taken
in equation (6). Hence x¯′1 varies continuously with x¯1. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem therefore
implies that there exists a non-empty set of fixed points x¯1, each of which corresponds to an
equilibrium. It is simple to show that the set of fixed points will be compact.28 Hence the maximum
fixed point and the corresponding equilibrium exist and are unique.
(2) The argument is similar for the maximum-disclosure equilibrium described by Solution 2.
Minimum & Maximum Disclosure: (1) Minimum-disclosure equilibrium:
Solution 1 defines firm strategy σmin (x1) as a function of both outcome x1 and market expec-
tation x¯1. For clarity, I will now write both terms explicitly: σ
min (x1, x¯1). Solution 1 identifies a
subset of monotonic equilibria which satisfy σ (x1) = σ
min (x1, x¯1) and equation (6). I show that for
any monotonic equilibrium outside this set, there is an equilibrium in the set with strictly less dis-
closure and weakly higher x¯1. Since Solution 1 selects the equilibrium with minimum-disclosure and
maximum x¯1 from within this set, it selects equilibrium with minimum disclosure and maximum
x¯1 among all monotonic equilibria.
Let x¯1 and σ (x1) 6= σmin (x1, x¯1) form a monotonic equilibrium. For a given x¯1, σmin (x1, x¯1)
describes the minimum disclosure that can be incentive compatible for each outcome x1. Hence
σ (x1) ≥ σmin (x1, x¯1) at all x1.29 By monotonicity, σ (x1) = (0, 0) for all x1 < x¯1. So σ (x1) 6=
σmin (x1, x¯1) implies that for some x1 ≥ x¯1, σ (x1) > σmin (x1, x¯1) and everywhere else σ (x1) =
σmin (x1, x¯1). Therefore by altering the strategy from σ (x1) to σ
min (x1, x¯1) the direct effect is less
disclosure. The indirect effect is that the market expectation consistent with σmin (x1, x¯1) will be
weakly greater than x¯1, due to more good news being concealed: x¯
′
1
(
σmin (x1, x¯1)
) ≥ x¯1. This
relaxes the concealment IC constraint, and makes still more concealment possible. In particular,
28Each set of fixed points is compact: Take a sequence of fixed points
{
xk
}
that converges to x. Since x¯1 (x) is
continuous, then
{
x¯1
(
xk
)} → x¯1 (x). Since all xk are fixed points, the two sequences are the same, so x¯1 (x) = x,
and x is also a fixed point. Finally, x ∈ [A1, B1], because a closed set contains the limit points of all its sequences.
29In all equilibria, σH (x1) =
{
σˆH (x1, x¯1) , σL (x1) = 0
1 , σL (x1) > 0
for all x1 > x¯1. No other strategy for the high-
type could be incentive compatible if σL (x1) is incentive compatible. Therefore σH (x1) ≥ σminH (x1, x¯1). For x1 >
x¯1 + RL (0, 1), the outcome x1 exceeds market expectations by more than the maximum reputational benefit for
concealment. Hence it must be disclosed by both types in any equilibrium: σ (x1) = σ
min (x1, x¯1) = (1, 1). For
x1 ≤ x¯1 +RL (0, 1), clearly σL (x1) ≥ σminL (x1, x¯1) = 0.
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there exists x¯∗ ≥ x¯1 such that x¯∗ and σmin (x1, x¯∗) form an equilibrium.30 Clearly σmin (x1, x¯∗) ≤
σmin (x1, x¯1) so this equilibrium has strictly less disclosure than the initial equilibrium with x¯1 and
σ (x1).
(2) Maximum-disclosure equilibrium:
First note that the described maximum disclosure equilibrium has maximum disclosure among
all strictly monotonic equilibria. Among weakly monotonic equilibria, the equilibrium with maxi-
mum disclosure differs only in that σ = (1, L/H) at x1 = x¯1.
Let x¯1 and σ (x1) 6= σmax (x1, x¯1) form a strict monotonic equilibrium. By strict monotonicity,
σ (x1) = σ
max (x1, x¯1) = 0 for all x1 ≤ x¯1. For a given x¯1, σmax (x1, x¯1) describes the maximum dis-
closure that can be incentive compatible for each outcome x1 > x¯1. Hence σ (x1) ≤ σmax (x1, x¯1).31
So σ (x1) 6= σmax (x1, x¯1) implies that for some x1 > x¯1, σ (x1) < σmax (x1, x¯1) and everywhere
else σ (x1) = σ
max (x1, x¯1). Therefore by altering the strategy from σ (x1) to σ
max (x1, x¯1) the
direct effect is more disclosure. The indirect effect is that the market expectation consistent with
σmax (x1, x¯1) will be weakly less than x¯1 (x¯
′
1 (σ
max (x1, x¯1)) ≤ x¯1), due to more good news (x1 > x¯1)
being disclosed. This relaxes the disclosure IC constraint, and makes still more disclosure possi-
ble. In particular, there exists x¯∗ ∈ (x¯S1 , x¯1] such that x¯∗ and σmax (x1, x¯∗) form an equilibrium.32
Clearly σmax (x1, x¯
∗) ≥ σmax (x1, x¯1) so this equilibrium has strictly more disclosure than the ini-
tial equilibrium with x¯1 and σ (x1). By a similar argument to that for the minimum-disclosure
equilibrium, this is sufficient to show that Solution 2 identifies the strictly-monotonic equilibrium
with maximum-disclosure and minimum x¯1. (For the weakly-monotonic equilibria with maximum
disclosure, the argument is the same, except that at precisely x¯1, σ = (1, L/H) is possible.)
(3) The inequality RH (0, 0) < RH (0, 1) < RL (0, 1) follows from comparative statics results in
Section 4.1 and Bayes’ rule (equations 12-13).
30As argued earlier, x¯′1
(
σmin (x1, x¯1)
)
is continuous in x¯1. Moreover x¯
′
1
(
σmin (x1, B1)
)
= µ1 < B1. Coupled with
x¯′1
(
σmin (x1, x¯1)
) ≥ x¯1, this implies that there exists a x¯∗ ∈ [x¯1, B1) such that x¯′1 (σmin (x1, x¯∗)) = x¯∗.
31In all equilibria, σH (x1) =
{
σˆH (x1, x¯1) , σL (x1) = 0
1 , σL (x1) > 0
for all x1 > x¯1. No other strategy for the high-
type could be incentive compatible if σL (x1) is incentive compatible. Therefore σL (x1) ≤ σmaxL (x1, x¯1) implies
σH (x1) ≤ σmaxH (x1, x¯1) for all x1 > x¯1. Whenever the low-type discloses x1 > x¯1in equilibrium, her reputational
benefit for concealing an outcome must be at least RL (1, 1) since σL > 0 implies σH = 1 and RL is decreasing in
σL. Hence in any equilibria, the low-type must conceal (σL (x1) = σ
max
L (x1, x¯1) = 0) for x1 ∈ (x¯1, x¯1 + RL (1, 1)).
For x1 ≥ x¯1 +RL (1, 1), clearly σL (x1) ≤ σmaxL (x1, x¯1) = 1.
32As argued earlier, x¯′1 (σ
max (x1, x¯1)) is continuous in x¯1. Moreover, by the same logic in the proof of Proposition
2 part 2, x¯′1
(
σmax
(
x1, x¯
S
1
))
> x¯S1 . Coupled with x¯
′
1 (σ
max (x1, x¯1)) ≤ x¯1, this implies that there exists a x¯∗ ∈ (x¯S1 , x¯1]
such that x¯′1 (σ
max (x1, x¯
∗)) = x¯∗.
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B.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. (1) The D1 criterion and Universal Divinity both impose Condition 1 for x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1).
(a) Disclosure must be on the equilibrium path for all x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1): Suppose instead, that
there is no disclosure in equilibrium for some x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1). Then qc (x1) = q. The low-
type would benefit by making the off-equilibrium revelation of x1 given an off-equilibrium belief
qr (x1) ∈ [0, z] for some z > 0. Further, the low-type would benefit under a wider range of market
inferences about firm type than would the high-type. These refinements suggest that in this case
investors should infer that such a deviation was ”infinitely more likely” to be from the low-type.
The implied off-equilibrium belief qr (x1) = 0 would then make low-types want to deviate and reveal
x1.
(b) Given positive probability of disclosure for all x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1), Condition 1 must hold
in that range: (i) Below x¯1 + RH (1, 0), the high-type will never be willing to disclose bad news
(σbH (x1) = 0). Therefore, for x1 ∈ (x¯1 + RD1, x¯1 + RH (1, 0)], if disclosure is on the equilibrium
path, it must be solely by the low-type. This implies qr = 0 and qc ≥ q, which means the low-type
strictly prefers disclosure (σbL (x1) = 1).
(ii) For x1 ∈ (x¯1 + max {RD1, RH (1, 0)} , x¯1), if disclosure were solely by the low-type (σH = 0,
σL > 0), the low-type would strictly prefer disclosure (σL (x1) = 1) since x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1). But
σH (x1) = 0 and σL (x1) = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. Since x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RH (1, 0) , x¯1), the high-
type would want to deviate by disclosing x1. Therefore, if there is positive probability of disclosure
in this range, it must be by both types (σH , σL > 0). Increasing differences (equation 17) then
implies σL (x1) = 1.
For all bad news, the high-type cannot disclose with greater than probability LH (σH ≤ LH ),
since beyond that point qr > qc and no one would want to disclose. Thus, the high-type must be
mixing, and therefore indifferent between concealment and disclosure. This indifference is precisely
the condition that uniquely specifies σH (x1) in Condition 1 for x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RH (1, 0) , x¯1).
(2) Condition 1 for x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1) implies both D1 criterion and Universal Divinity are
met: For any equilibrium meeting Condition 1 in the range x1 ∈ (x¯1 +RD1, x¯1), the only possible
off-equilibrium disclosures are of bad news below x¯1+RD1 or of good news. At any point x1 for which
neither firm type discloses in equilibrium, Bayes’ rule dictates that qc (x1) = q. Therefore, for any
such point below x¯1 + RD1, neither firm would benefit from making an off-equilibrium disclosure,
even under the most favorable off-equilibrium belief qr (x1) = 0. As a result, D1 Criterion and
Universal Divinity place no restriction on off-equilibrium beliefs. For off-equilibrium revelations of
good news, the D1 Criterion and Universal Divinity restrict the market inference to be qr = 1,
as the high-type would benefit from disclosure under a wider range of market inferences than the
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low-type. Any equilibrium with full concealment of good news at x1 with off-equilibrium belief
qr (x1) < 1, will still be an equilibrium with off-equilibrium belief qr (x1) = 1, as this only makes
disclosure less profitable.
(3) Existence: For example, take the minimum-disclosure strategy in Solution 1 for all good
news, and Condition 1 for all bad news. These specify σ = {σL (x) , σH (x)} as a function of x¯1,
and equation 6 gives x¯1 as a function of σ. Hence Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem guarantees an
equilibrium exists, by the same argument as that in Proposition 6.
(4) Multiplicity: The argument in (3) applies for any other strategy incentive compatible with
x¯1 and consistent second-period market beliefs that can be described as a function of x¯1, such
that it changes continuously with x¯1 almost everywhere. For example, I could have chosen the
maximum-disclosure strategy for good news.
B.7 Proof of Remark 1
Proof. For fixed x¯1, Condition 1 specifies the maximum possible disclosure of bad news. For a
uniform distribution, shifting x¯1, and therefore the range over which bad news is disclosed, does
not affect the probability that bad news is disclosed. The only exception would be if x¯1 +RL (1, 0)
were less than A1, so that bad news disclosure was outside the support of outcomes. In this case,
an alternate equilibrium with higher x¯1 could have higher probability of bad-news disclosure.
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